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Nayha Acharya*

Reply to Edmond & Roach and Susan Haack's
Replies to Law's Treatment of Science: From
Idealization to Understanding

I am grateful to Professors Edmond and Roach' and Professor Haack2 for
their thoughtful replies to my paper, Law 's Treatment of Science: From
Idealizationto Understanding.Much like my experience after reading "A
Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State's Forensic Science
and Medical Evidence,"' and Haack's contributions, 4 I have come away
from reviewing Edmond and Roach and Haack's replies with a heightened
awareness that the admissibility of scientific evidence is significant and
complicated. Both replies have raised important concerns that have
demanded further attention from me, which I turn to here. My response to
Edmond and Roach's Reply is in Part I below, followed by my response to
Haack's Reply in Part II.
I. Reply to Edmond and Roach
1. The asymmetrical demonstrable reliabilityapproach
In ACA, Edmond and Roach argued that Crown expert evidence should
be subject to a more onerous admissibility standard than defence expert
evidence. In their Reply, Edmond and Roach notably deemphasize the
asymmetrical approach that they advocate in ACA. In their recap of the
position they advanced in ACA, Edmond and Roach comment that the
asymmetrical aspects of their approach were qualified.' Later in the Reply,
the authors note that a "slightly higher admissibility standard will have a
range of system benefits regardless of whether it is applied asymmetrically
or symmetrically,"6 again destressing their asymmetrical approach.
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In addition, they express confusion over why I endorse the Goudge
Recommendations, but not the approach they argue for in ACA, remarking
that "[i]n practice, the differences between the Goudge recommendations
and our own proposal are.. .relatively minor."' But the Goudge Inquiry
Report did not recommend an asymmetrical model. By suggesting that
their approach is not significantly different from the Goudge Inquiry
approach, Edmond and Roach further diminish the importance of the
asymmetrical aspect of their proposal.
I acknowledge that in ACA, Edmond and Roach take note that their
asymmetrical approach may not find widespread support, and that if that
is the case, then they could live with an "across the board" application
of demonstrable reliability for admissibility. But their argument in ACA
undoubtedly calls for an asymmetrical approach to admissibility of expert
evidence. In ACA, Edmond and Roach introduce their argument as follows:
We are supportive of more demanding standardsfor the admissibility
of incriminating expert evidence. Indeed, we go beyond current legal

practice and proposals for reform to argue for demonstrable reliability
whenever the state adduces expert evidence to support a criminal
conviction (or induce a plea).. .At the same time, we would recommend
that expert evidence adduced by the defense need only satisfy a basic

reliability threshold, but would require that judges apply admissibility
standards in a robust contextual fashion even should our asymmetrical
proposal, which places higher standards on the state, not find favour."
Throughout ACA, Edmond and Roach insist that their demonstrable
reliability standard should be applied to "incriminating expert evidence,"
clearly demonstrating the asymmetry of their approach. Indeed, they
criticize the Law Commission of England and Wales for rejecting an
asymmetrical admissibility model.9 The asymmetrical approach was also
advocated in Edmond's paper, "Pathological Science? Demonstrable
Reliability and Expert Forensic Pathology Evidence," which was prepared
as a research paper for the Goudge Inquiry. There, Edmond explained:
The basic contention is that courts should not admit expert evidence
adduced by the prosecution unless there are good grounds for believing
that the evidence is reliable. Expressed more precisely, judges should not
admit expertevidence adduced by the prosecutionunless that evidence is

demonstrably reliable.10

7. Ibid at 88.
8. ACA, supranote 3 at 345-346 [emphasis added].
9.
Ibid at 376 and 379.
10. Gary Edmond, PathologicalScience? DemonstrableReliability andExpert ForensicPathology
Evidence (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 2007), prepared as a research paper for the Goudge
Inquiry [PathologicalScience] at 1 [emphasis added].
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It is not until their final remarks in ACA that a symmetrical approach is
again given a brief mention. In their conclusion, Edmond and Roach state
that:
For pragmatic reasons, we could contemplate tempering the strength of
our asymmetrical commitments. While we believe that criminaljustice
systems should entrench a different admissibility standardfor expert
evidence adduced by the statefrom those for expert evidence adduced

by those accusedofcrime, the most important single reform would be to
raise the admissibility standard across the board."
Edmond and Roach's acknowledgment that an asymmetrical admissibility
standard may not find favour does not lead to the conclusion that they
advocate anything less than an asymmetrical model. Instead, their
statements suggest that the authors will tolerate a symmetrical approach, if
necessary. In Law ' Treatment ofScience, I provided an argument for why
the asymmetrical approach argued for in A CA cannot find favour. I argued
that Edmond and Roach's commitment to the asymmetrical proposal
reflected an underemphasis on the importance of procedural consistency
as the source of legitimacy of our legal system.'2 The asymmetry of their
approach is one of the reasons that I was able to endorse the Goudge
Inquiry approach to admissibility over the approach presented in ACA.
The Goudge Inquiry did not advocate an asymmetrical approach to
admissibility of expert evidence; the A CA approach did.
Along with the asymmetric component of the ACA approach, I also
offered a critique of the demonstrable reliability standard itself. This
element of my critique remains the same, whether or not the demonstrable
reliability standard is applied symmetrically or asymmetrically. I argued
that the demonstrable reliability standard risks allowing empirical
reasoning to usurp legal decision-making. Pointing to Edmond and
Roach's proposed treatment of the Crown evidence in Abbey,13 I noted
that the demonstrable reliability standard required that the link between an
expert's evidence and the legal issue at stake must be empirically supported
before the evidence would even be admitted.14 This suggests that empirical
support is required to satisfy the legal question of relevance. I therefore
suggested that Edmond and Roach display a preference for empirical
reasoning that can result in unsound legal reasoning. Because empirical
evidence is typical of scientific study, I suggested that the demonstrable
11. ACA, supranote 3 at 408 [emphasis added).
12. Law s Treatment ofScience, supra note 1 at 21-29.
13. RvAbbey, 2009 ONCA 624.
14. Law s Treatment ofScience, supra note 1 at 24-25.
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reliability standard (as expounded in the application to Abbey) contained
an inadvertent idealization of science, coupled with an underappreciation
of legal processes.
Edmond and Roach do not answer my critique in this respect, except
to say that they "acknowledge that there will be complex debates around
what levels of accuracy ought to sustain admissibility and what to do
about fields or areas where testing and evaluation is difficult-as in the
simmering controversy around Abbey.""
2. The problem of wrongful convictions
In ACA, it was evident that Edmond and Roach's foremost concern was
the prevention of wrongful convictions. This concern is featured in their
Reply. They criticize the procedural legitimacy framework on the basis that
it leads me to understate, and maybe even ignore, the calamitous impact of
wrongful convictions. In their Reply, they express their dissatisfaction with
my approach, which displays their commitment that wrongful convictions
are illegitimate:
Where a person is imprisoned and the evidence seems to suggest real
doubts about their guilt or indicates innocence, we are not satisfied by
"legal facts" derived through procedurally regular processes. To the extent
that the legal system is unwilling to rectify such anomalies, outcomes are
illegitimate and inconsistent with espoused criminal justice principles.'"
Edmond and Roach's discontent is misdirected. First, if evidence presented
at trial suggested real doubts about the accused's guilt, yet a conviction
was entered anyway, then the outcome is illegitimate under the procedural
legitimacy framework. The outcome is procedurally improper because the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof was misapplied. Second,
where new knowledge or evidence becomes available after a conviction,
and raises doubts about the person's guilt, then by no means does the
procedural legitimacy argument preclude ministerial reviews to rectify
a wrongful conviction. Given their severity, reviewing cases where a
wrongful conviction may have occurred is surely essential, even if the
conviction was a procedurally sound outcome.
Certainly, the procedural legitimacy argument leads to the conclusion
that factually inaccurate outcomes can be legitimate, if they are made in
accordance with legal procedure. Edmond and Roach cannot agree because
they are unwilling to label a wrongful conviction as legitimate, whether or
not it is procedurally sound. This is not logically sustainable.
15.
16.

Edmond and Roach's Reply, supra note 1 at 70.
Ibid at 72.
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Starting from the premise that a standard of proof of certainty is too
onerous, we all accept the legitimacy of a standard of proof that is less
than certainty. If we are willing to allow legal facts to be considered
"proven," even if they are not certainly true, then it follows that we accept
a risk of factual inaccuracy in legal fact-finding. Since we accept the risk
of factual error, we must also accept that the risk will eventually manifest
(i.e., a factual error will occur). It is illogical to conclude that a factually
inaccurate outcome is illegitimate, and can invalidate the legitimacy of the
legal system, when at the same time, we accept a standard of proof that is
less than certainty. By accepting the standards of legal proof of less than
certainty, we accept that factual errors will occur. It is improper to call into
question the entire legal system when such factual errors do occur.
Committed to this logic, I maintain that factually inaccurate outcomes
can still be legitimate legal decisions. Of course, these factual inaccuracies
can be devastating to litigants, particularly in the context of wrongful
conviction. Wrongful convictions, and other factually inaccurate legal
decisions, represent extremely unfortunate manifestations of the reality
that adjudication is an inevitably uncertain task.
Edmond and Roach's disapproval of my argument that factual
inaccuracy does not itselfdelegitimate a legal outcome reveals the internal
inconsistency embedded within their approach. If a wrongful conviction
can never be considered legitimate, then it must follow that individuals
must only be convicted on the standard of certainty. In this line of
reasoning, the only possible solution that could save the legitimacy of the
legal system is increasing the standard of proof for convictions to a level
of certainty."
But Edmond and Roach do not advocate that convictions can or
should only be entered on the basis of certainty. They do accept a standard
of proof that is less than certainty, so they start from the same premise as I
do-we all accept the legitimacy of our standards of proof. As explained
above, if we accept a standard of proof that is less than certainty, we must
accept the risk that at some point, a factual inaccuracy will occur. Yet
Edmond and Roach suggest that wrongful convictions, even those that
are procedurally proper, are wholly illegitimate, and any system wherein
wrongful convictions occur is producing illegitimate outcomes. This
approach is incoherent because it is impossible to accept the legitimacy of
17. In Law's Treatment of Science, at 27-28, 1pointed out that increasing the standard of proof was
the logical conclusion of Edmond and Roach's approach in ACA. In their reply, Edmond and Roach
imply that I advocate for this approach. I do not. My purpose was to show that their line of argument,
which starts from the premise that wrongful convictions are wholly unacceptable, can lead only to the
conclusion that the standard of proof must be raised.
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proving legal facts on a basis of something less than certainty, and at the
same time reject the reality that a factual error will occur.
Procedural legitimacy is grounded on the notion that legal standards
of proof expressly contemplate uncertainty and risk of factual error. When
Edmond and Roach suggest that I consider the standard of proof to be
an adequate safeguard against factual impropriety, they mischaracterize
my argument." My argument is that so long as we accept our standards
of proof as legitimate, it is only a matter of logic that we must accept the
possibility of factually inaccurate outcomes. If factual accuracy cannot
dictate legitimacy, then what is the source of legitimacy of adjudicative
outcomes? My conclusion is that the legitimacy of the legal system
is maintained through consistent application of legal procedure to all
litigants, equally, without compromise.
II. Reply to Susan Haack
In Law ' Treatment of Science, I focused on Haack's contributions that
compared the adjudicative system and science. 9 I suggested that her
project of presenting the essentials of law and science to diagnose the
tension between the fields is compromised because procedural legitimacy,
being a fundamental feature of adjudication, is underemphasized. This
undervaluation was significant to my theme in Law 's Treatment ofScience:
procedure plays a critical role in maintaining the legitimacy of uncertain
inquiries and outcomes. Of course, my primary concern was (and remains)
legitimacy in the legal sphere, but I noted that uncertainty is inherent in
scientific inquiry as well as adjudicative inquiry.
1. Science
Predictably, Haack has criticized my comments on science. Without a
doubt, I presented a simple notion of science. It was sufficient, because
18. Edmond and Roach's Reply, supra note I at 78-80.
19. As Haack points out in her Reply, "over the last decade or so, [she has] done a good deal of
work on issues concerning scientific testimony" (Haack's Reply, supra note 2 at 41). The abundance
of her input into the science and law topic is catalogued in footnote 3 of her Reply. I look forward to
further study of these contributions. Haack's criticism, however, that my "superficial understandings"
of science and law are "compounded by the fact that [I am] apparently unaware that the couple of
papers of [hers] that [I have] read are part of a much larger, and intimately integrated, body of work,"
is unduly demanding. I did not assume that a number of different articles, published in a number of
different places, were so closely interconnected to one another, that any critique of one is necessarily
incomplete without a study of all the others. I understood the comparison between science and law
to be a particularly central theme in "Truth and Justice" and "Irreconcilable Differences," supra note
4. In Law' Treatment of Science, I had prefaced my comments on Haack's works with a quotation
from "Irreconcilable Differences," which Haack found "tendentiously edited" because I stopped at the
first tension between science and law that was listed: "the investigative character of science and the
adversarial culture of our legal system." Haack does go on to list further tensions between science and
law, but I had understood the first item listed to contain the central theme of her comparison between
science and law.
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my point was modest: science, like law, involves an uncertain inquiry.
No matter how complicated and nuanced one's concept of science and
scientific progress, it must be acceptable that whatever science is, it is
an uncertain inquiry. There is no guarantee that a scientific conclusion of
today, even one that is generally accepted, will not be falsified or negated
in one way or another tomorrow. It is unnecessary to look any further than
the general discourse of science to discern that scientists inherently accept
the uncertainty of their work. Scientists make falsifiable hypotheses, and
set out to test them. If they remain unfalsified, hypotheses may eventually
become theories. The theories may gain general acceptance, but they
remain theories, not "truths." As Haack notes, although science is an
inquiry seeking to accurately explain phenomena, this does not suggest
that "scientific truths are ever known with absolute certainty."20
Since an outcome can be "scientific" but not certainly true, it follows
that the legitimacy of a scientific inquiry cannot be determined purely by
whether the outcome is factually accurate or not. This, I suggested, leads
to the conclusion that the method or procedure of scientific inquiry must be
its legitimizing factor. The significance of method as the defining feature
of scientific inquiry is explicit in Thomas Huxley's quotation that Haack
suggests is the starting point of her "Critical-Common-sensist account"
of science: "the man of science simply uses with scrupulous exactness
the methods which we all.. .use carelessly." 2 ' Here, Huxley suggests that
the method, or the process of the inquiry, is what makes a scientist's work
distinguishable from a layperson's ponderings. My purpose in Law s
Treatment of Science was not to unequivocally define scientific methods.
Rather, the idea was to show that an inquiry that inherently accepts its
own conditions of uncertainty cannot legitimize itself by its substantive
outcomes alone. This lends itself to the conclusions that methods play
a foundational role in determining the legitimacy of an inquiry, and its
outcome. This, I suggested, is a similarity that science and law share.
I used the inherent uncertainty of scientific inquiry as an introduction
to my more central project of demonstrating how the inherent uncertainty
in the legal process makes the importance of procedure in judicial decisions
self-evident. Even though we know that adjudicative outcomes are not
certainly true, we accept the legitimacy of legal inquiry and its outcomes,
even if those outcomes cannot be guaranteed to be factually accurate. The

20. "Irreconcilable Differences," supranote 4 at 7.
21. Haack Reply, supra note 2 at 49, quoting Thomas Huxley from JW Grove, In Defense of
Science: Science, Technology and Politics in Modern Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1989).
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basis for that acceptance, I argued, must be that adherence to procedure
maintains the legitimacy of adjudicative outcomes.
For my purpose, it was not necessary to enter into a philosophical
debate about the nature of science, or to engage with questions like "'how
is scientific inquiry connected to the world?' or, 'what distinguishes good,
solid, honest, thorough scientific inquiry from bad, flimsy, dishonest,
partial, or skimpy work?'" 2 2 These are interesting questions in their own
right, but they are not centrally relevant to the project of determining
admissibility and appropriate use of expert evidence. As I noted in Law
Treatment ofScience, expert evidence should be treated consistently in the
legal process whether the evidence can be labelled scientific or not. Treating
some types of evidence differently than other types on the basis that it is
understood to be science, must be avoided, because legal procedures must
be applied consistently to all litigants. If not, then procedural consistency,
and therefore the overall legitimacy of the adjudicative system, is at stake.
When Haack comments that my "conception of what makes a legal
decision or system legitimate implies that what threatens legitimacy
is violation of procedure," she accurately describes my viewpoint. But
she then asks, "So how, exactly, is idealizing science supposed to be the
threat?" 23 Idealization of science translates in the adjudicative arena as
deference to science. Such deference prevents procedural rules from
being applied properly to scientific evidence. The problem of deference
to science distorting legal fact-finding was explained by Sopinka J. in R v
Mohan,24 and is set out in Law ' Treatment ofScience.25
2. Legitimacy of the adjudicativeprocess
Haack maintains that I have presented a very skeletal concept of the
legitimacy of the adjudicative system.26 First, the goal of Law ' Treatment
of Science was to demonstrate that the acceptance of uncertainty, which
is inherent in the process of legal fact-finding, necessitates the conclusion
that the legitimacy of legal outcomes cannot depend on substantive
accuracy alone. On that basis, the significance of procedural legitimacy
becomes self-evident.
I do not, however, misunderstand Haack's point, nor unduly neglect
its significance: of course, a proceduralist argument depends on the
acceptability of substantive law, including the substance of the procedural

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Haack Reply, supra note 2 at 46.
Ibid at 48.
[1994] 2 SCR 9.
See Law's Treatment of Science, supra note I at 4-5.
Haack's Reply, supranote 2 at 47.
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laws. But this does not diminish the argument for the importance of
maintaining procedural propriety to ensure legitimate adjudicative
outcomes. Even when the substantive law is legitimate, an adjudicative
decision can become illegitimate due to procedural compromise. In that
sense, procedural propriety can be understood as a trump in adjudicative
turf. My focus was on the legitimacy of adjudicative decisions, and
particularly adjudicative fact-finding on the basis of a standard of proof
that is less than certainty; my focus was not the legitimacy of substantive
Canadian law. The superficial referencesto Chinese and Pakistani law
were not relevant to me.27 Nor were those references helpful in making
the point that substantive law needs some justification for a proceduralist
argument for the legitimacy of the entire legal system to be at its most
robust. Considering the parameters of my project, such justification was
not within my scope.
Since it was not necessary for me to delve into the legitimacy of
substantive law, Haack was led to question whether I "could possibly be
taking current Canadian evidentiary procedure to be ideal, incapable of
improvement in any respect."28 The answer is no. My argument is that
consistent adherence to existing legal procedure maintains the legitimacy
of adjudicative outcomes now. Indeed these procedures can be improved.
The Goudge Inquiry, which I endorse, suggests ways that they can be
improved. But the improvements must be consistent, so that all litigants
are subject to the same legal procedures. The improvements must not
be based on an effort to better accommodate science either by allowing
different procedures to be applied to scientific evidence, or by imposing
science-based reasoning on legal questions. On this basis, I endorsed the
Goudge Inquiry report for its consistency with procedural legitimacy:
the recommendations provide judges with the tools to apply the same
procedural rules that they apply to all expert evidence, properly and
consistently, to scientific or otherwise technical expert evidence.
Finalcomment
Edmond and Roach ' Reply and Haack ' Reply have alerted me to those
areas of my argument that required further attention. I am obliged by their
replies, and I have been fortunate to have their helpful input. I remain,
however, committed to the concept of procedural correctness, and
advocating its significance in maintaining the overall legitimacy of the
adjudicative system.

27.
28.

Ibid at 47.
Ibid at 48.

